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rHE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF

1964:

CATALYST IN THE CONTINUING

FORMULATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT.

I. Introduction
"The right of competent counsel must be assured every man accused
of crime in a Federal court regardless of his means."1

In the 1938 case of Johnson v. Zerbst,2 the Supreme Court, through Mr.
Justice Black, held that unless intelligently waived, a criminal defendant in a
federal court had the right to have counsel appointed if unable to secure his
own. That opinion made the newly articulated right an absolute one, the sixth
amendment being interpreted to render all convictions void, for lack of proper
jurisdiction, where counsel was not appointed in such circumstances.' For the
next quarter century, however, the Johnson v. Zerbst doctrine4 was often honored
more in form than in substance. Young and inexperienced attorneys were appointed, sometimes haphazardly, to represent most of the resourceless criminal
defendants. There was no provision made for the financing of the investigative
and other services necessary for an adequate defense, much less for the reimbursement of the assigned counsels' out-of-pocket expenses, and counsel were
appointed, not at the defendant's initial appearance, but later at his arraignment.
The legislative response to the obvious inadequacies of this system came finally
with the passage of the Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964,' which not only
assures counsel for all" federal criminal defendants financially unable to retain
their own, from their initial appearance through appeal, but also compensates
such counsel, and provides funds for investigative, expert and "other" services
necessary for an adequate defense. No discussion of "Justice and the Poor"
would be complete without an analysis of this recent enactment.
The Criminal Justice Act is unquestionably the most far-reaching presentday statute, state or federal, dealing with the resourceless criminal defendant.
In the short period 7 the Act has been in effect it has deeply involved a sub1 John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Address, January 14, 1963.
2 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
3 Id. at 468. It seems clear as originally written and often used, the sixth amendment
guaranteed little more than the right of a prisoner to hire an attorney if he so wished:
History denied such a meaning [the Johnson v. Zerbst interpretation] to the counsel
provision of the Sixth Amendment, and no responsible authority, scholarly or
judicial, had held it to be within the scope of the Amendment. Yet, as has so
often been true with other doctrines, it was possible for a court deeply conscious
of the value of individual rights to transform the right to counsel in federal courts
into a comprehensive safeguard for all defendants, whether indigent or financially

able.

BEANEY,

THE

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS

32-3 (1955).

See also Holtzoff, Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1, 7-9
(1944).
4 The doctrine has been incorporated into FED. R. GRIm. P. 44: "If the defendant
appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and
assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceedings unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."
5 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (Supp. 1965), hereinafter cited as the Criminal Justice Act.
The Act is reprinted in full in an Appendix to this Note.
6 Except those charged with petty offenses. See § (b) of the Act.
7 Although signed by President Johnson on August 20, 1964, the Criminal Justice Act
did not go into effect until August 20, 1965.
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stantial portion of the American legal profession in the field of criminal defense,
although the results of this involvement are not yet measurable. Though applying only to the federal court system, this enactment will surely prove to be a
major catalyst for further advances on the state level, as have so many previous
federal programs in other areas. The purpose of this Note is to explain the
background, provisions and implementation of the Act, in the light of its professed goal of securing a better brand of justice for the financially disadvantaged.
II. Background of the Act
As early as 1937, the Judicial Conference of the United States called for
the enactment of a program whereby public defenders would be named to
handle the indigent criminal work in those districts which had a sufficient volume
of such cases. As for districts without a good number of criminal cases involving indigents, the Conference also went on record as favoring compensation for
counsel who would be assigned on an individual basis.' This idea was a continuing one, being consistently advocated by the Judicial Conference and successive Attorneys General. Although several bills managed to receive a degree of
favorable treatment in the Congress, not enough interest was generated to secure
passage. 9
In early 1961, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, continuing the efforts
of his predecessors, appointed a nine-man committee, 0 chaired by Professor
Francis A. Allen of the University of Michigan Law School, to study poverty
and the administration of criminal justice in the federal court system. The Allen
Committee Report,' the product of this group's two-year study, cited impressive statistics which seemed to demonstrate clearly the inadequacies of assigning
uncompensated counsel. For example, the study showed that during 1961 in
the Northern District of Illinois seventy-five per cent of those defendants assigned
counsel pleaded guilty, whereas only twenty per cent of those who retained
private counsel so pleaded.' The report, however, wisely cautioned against conclusions based solely on these statistics, pointing out that much of the disparity
was attributable to the fact that an impoverished criminal was more than likely
8

Kutak, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 44 NEB. L. REV. 703, 711 (1965).

This

article contains a detailed treatment of the Act's background, with particular emphasis on
its legislative history. Mr. Kutak was formerly administrative assistant to Senator Roman L.
Hruska (R. Neb.), one of the principal sponsors of the bill.
9 Id. at 711-18. For a further discussion of the earlier bills, see Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REv. 559, 596-99 (1951), and Celler,

Federal Legislative Proposals to Supply Paid Counsel to Indigent Persons Accused of Crime,
45 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1961). See also Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal
Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARv. L. Rv. 579, 607-13 (1963), which

analyzed the various bills considered by Congress before enacting the Criminal Justice Act.
10 The Committee consisted of: John Bodner, Jr., of the District of Columbia bar; Joseph
Goldstein, Professor of Law at Yale; John F. Grady, of the Illinois bar; Walter E. Hoffman,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia; James M. Marsh, of the
Pennsylvania bar; George Nye, of the California bar; Herbert L. Packer, Professor of Law
at Stanford; Walter V. Schaefer, Associate Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court; and Francis
A. Allen, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan.

11 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADmINISTRATION oF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963) (hereinafter cited as the Allen Committee
Report).

12

Id. at 29.
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to have committed a crime of high visibility, with correspondingly less chance
of a plausible defense and often no real doubt as to guilt." Basing its conclusions,
then, "on direct observation and the informed judgment of competent observers,' 14 rather than statistics, the report indicted the indigent representation procedure of the day for having (a) encouraged guilty pleas, due to the futility of
defenses without resources, (b) adversely affected the quality of the defenses
made, and (c) constituted an unfair burden, at times even an economic hardship,' on the legal profession." It is interesting to note that in contrast to this
critical report a contemporaneous survey of district court judges and United
States attorneys indicated that they generally considered the quality of such
representation to be quite adequate," possibly due to their intimate connection
with its operation. They were, however, heavily in favor of a system of compensation."
The Allen Committee Report 9 gave the reform movement added impetus
by attracting strong support from the Kennedy Administration." The Administration support, together with a well-organized drive on the part of the American Bar Association,2' was decisive, and the bill was passed in late summer of
1964.22
It might seem that at this point a discussion of the Criminal Justice Act's
legislative history would be appropriate. However, this legislative history is
extensively treated elsewhere." It might be noted here that the congressional
debate was not without some rather caustic criticism of the Act's underlying
13

Id. at 28-9:
Mhe impoverished accused most often will commit offenses that have a high degree
of visibility. In the federal courts he is likely to be charged with such crimes as sale
of narcotics, transportation of stolen vehicles, and thefts against the mails. In many
situations the defendant is apprehended in the streets as he commits the offense or
with incriminating goods or objects on his person. Frequently such a defendant
has signed a confession before counsel enters the case. It is thus true that in
these cases there is often no substantial question of guilt and that representation
must be directed primarily to the issue of sentence or other disposition. Accordingly,
statistics showing, for example, a higher percentage of pleas of guilty among cases
in which defendants are represented by assigned counsel may reveal more about
the character of the crimes committed than the quality of the representation.
14 Id. at 29.
15 Id. at 29-30. For example, in one murder case in the District of Columbia where
counsel was assigned, the defendant was tried five times and took an appeal. Cases like this
not only consume hundreds of hours of the assigned counsel's time, but also result in a critical
loss of income.
16 Id. at 29.
17 Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District
Courts, 76 HAst. L. Rsv. 579, 599 (1963). The conclusions of this Note were based in
part on a detailed questionnaire sent to every district judge and U. S. attorney. Thirty per
cent of those responding considered assigned counsel's work "excellent," thirty per cent rated
it "good," while less than ten per cent thought it to be "inadequate." Some even considered
representation by assigned counsel better than that given by privately retained counsel.
18 Id. at 605. One-eighth preferred the noncompensatory system, one-tenth were undecided, and the rest preferred some plan providing compensation to assigned counsel.
19 It should be noted that the Allen Committee Report also dealt with problems other
than those the Criminal Justice Act attempts to alleviate, such as bail.
20 President Kennedy's remark in his 1963 State of the Union Address, the introductory
quote to this Note, was cited by Kutak as the "turning point in the history of the legislation."
Kutak, supra note 8, at 715.
21 Id. at 716.
22 PUB. L. No. 455, 88th Cong., 2d Sess, § 3 (Aug. 20, 1964).
23 See authorities cited n. 8 and 9, supra.
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rationale of compensation for services rendered.24 Moreover, one key provision
of the original bill, the establishment of full-time public defenders in districts
with a heavy load of criminal cases, was killed just before passage due to substantial opposition.25
III. Provisions of the Act
A. Aid for the "Financially Unable"
Prior to the Criminal Justice Act, the commissioner or judge before whom
a defendant made his initial appearance was obliged only to advise the defendant
of his right to retain counsel if he so wished.2" That right has been enlarged
considerably by the Criminal Justice Act, section (b) of which provides that
at his initial appearance the criminal defendant shall be advised that,
[H]e has the right to be represented by counsel and that counsel will be
appointed if he is financially unable to do so. Unless the defendant waives
the appointment of counsel, the United States commissioner or the court,
if satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the defendant is financially unable
to obtain counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent himY.2 (Emphasis added.)
The term "financially unable" is ambiguous, but necessarily so. The Allen Committee Report had recommended the use of this terminology rather than "indigent" because the constitutional right to counsel had not been based on total
destitution, but rather on a lack of sufficient resources for the defendant to retain
counsel.' Thus, if the test adopted had been "indigency," the resulting statute
would have been much too narrow, if not unconstitutional in some cases.
As to how the court or commissioner is to determine whether or not a
particular defendant is "financially unable," the Act itself only states that it is
to be done by "appropriate inquiry." Despite the absence of detailed procedures
for this determination, however, the courts should not have a- great deal of
difficulty. One aid to the "appropriate inquiry" has been furnished by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts which has issued forms to be
completed and sworn to by all defendants asking for appointed counsel. The
shorter form, to be used in cases where there is little doubt as to the defendant's
financial status, requires that he list all liquid assets and property owned, in
addition to his place of employment, rate of compensation, and number of
dependents. " In closer cases where more detailed information is thought necessary, the long form of affidavit is used. In addition to the information called for
in the short form, this requires more detailed data as to real and personal
24 See, e.g., The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1964, p. 10, col. 4-5. This article darkly
suggested that judges might hand out cases to old friends sliort of cash, and that the program
would prove to be so costly and unmanageable that it would soon be abandoned.
25 Ibid. The strongest objection to the establishment of a Public Defender system was
that it would expand the federal bureaucracy, and amount to government agencies both
prosecuting and defending. See also Dimock, The Public Defender: A Step Towards a Police

State?, 42 A.B.A.J. 219 (1956).
26
27
28
29

FaD. R. CrM. P. 5(b).
The Act will not be formally cited since it is reprinted in its entirety in the Appendix.
Allen Committee Report, p. 7.
CJA FORM 1, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (1965).
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property, debts and other obligations."0 The court's duty is not ended with these
affidavits, however, for the Act itself places the tribunal under a continuing
obligation either to terminate the appointment of counsel or to authorize part
payment by the defendant if it appears at any time after appointment of counsel
that the defendant is actually able to retain his own lawyer."' Another aid to
the district courts, in addition to the affidavits, in their detennination of whether
or not a defendant is financially unable to retain counsel is the experience and
precedent developed under other federal statutes and rules which provide
gratuitous services for indigent defendants."
B. Method and Time of Counsel's Appointment
Under the previous practice, several district courts followed the "system"
of assigning counsel from among the lawyers who happened to be in court on
arraignment day. This often resulted in the appointment of inexperienced (or
mediocre) counsel, some of whom were primarily interested in the prompt disposition of the case or in the extraction of a fee from their assigned client.3
This type of arrangement could, of course, work well in the smaller districts,
where the judge would know and be able to evaluate the competency of these
attorneys, but in the more populous districts such judicial scrutiny was impos-

sible. Section (b) of the Criminal Justice Act ends this haphazard procedure;
it states unequivocally that assigned counsel "shall be selected from a panel of
attorneys designated or approved by the court." Of course this language does
not of itself assure competent and conscientious counsel, but many courts, with
the aid of local bar associations and defender organizations, have initiated detailed screening processes for the filling of these panels.3"
Section (c) of the Criminal Justice Act, which provides that a resourceless
defendant "shall be represented at every stage of the proceeding from his initial
appearance . . . through appeal," also represents a break with the past. Al-

though it has long been the federal rule that a defendant in a capital case must
be assigned counsel immediately upon his request, 3 it has been held that in a
30 OJA FORM 3, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (1965).
31 Section (c) also provides that if a defendant who has retained his own lawyer later
becomes unable to pay him, the court may appoint counsel for him. In addition, § (f) gives
the court the power, whenever it finds funds are available "from or on behalf of" a defendant
with assigned counsel, to authorize and direct payment by the defendant to his appointed
attorney.
32 See Carter and Hauser, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 36 F.R.D. 67 (1964).
Some of the statutes with like terms which the authors discuss are: 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915
("unable to pay . . . costs or give security therefor"); FED. R. CIuM. P. 15(c) ("cannot
bear the expense thereof"); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (indigent petitioner entitled to documents
without cost). The authors review many of the cases that have developed under these statutes,
and set forth typical situations which arise in trial courts in passing on the question as to
whether the defendant is unable to secure counsel.
33 Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District
Courts, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 579, 581-3, 596 (1963).
34 See textual discussion accompanying nn. 73-77, in!ra.
35 18 U.S.C. § 3005:
Whoever is indicted of treason or other capital crime, shall be allowed to make
his full defense by counsel learned in the law; and the court before which he
is tried or some judge thereof, shall immediately, upon his request, assign to him
such counsel. ...
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noncapital case, a plea of not guilty at arraignment without counsel does not
require reversal, unless prejudice is shown. " Section (C) not only assures counsel at arraignment but, more importantly, at the initial appearance before the
court or commissioner, thus recognizing the admitted value of counsel at this
stage of the proceedings. As one authority had noted, with reference to the
earlier practice:
Mhe present system of generally denying counsel until arraignment on the
plea is patently unfair to the defense .... The possible defense witness who
is never found, the prosecution witness' story that might have been different
if the defense had obtained an early interview, suggest the range of various
"might have been" factors aiding the defense which are eliminated by the
tardy appointment of counsel. And when an appellate court determines
that a trial is not lacking in fundamental fairness it must of necessity overlook the possible unseen harm of this nature suffered by the defendant.87
The Act is silent with regard to the actual mechanics of the appointment of
counsel. However, as to the time of appointment, it seems clear that the moment
a defendant states he wants counsel, the initial appearance proceedings should
stop, and counsel should either be immediately assigned, or the defendant should
be given the opportunity to retain an attorney. 8 Although the Act clearly gives
commissioners the right to appoint counsel, most of the judges of the Judicial
Conference's Committee to Implement the Act were of the opinion that district
judges would have to directly supervise such appointments."' Furthermore, the
district judge does not have to accept the commissioner's appointment, and can
terminate it when the defendant appears in court.'
In actual practice the appointment procedures vary from district to district.
For example, in the Western District of Texas the commissioner notifies the
judge and the judge then appoints counsel, although the commissioner may appoint when the judge is not available.4' Some plans have the commissioner appoint counsel only to serve in the hearings before him, but in this case there is a
danger period of nonrepresentation between the initial appearance and the trial,
which would contravene the Criminal Justice Act's philosophy of "continuity
of representation."' 2
43
To insure implementation of the right of representation "through appeal"
given defendants by the Criminal Justice Act, the Judicial Conference of the

36 See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 352 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The court did
note that "the problem presented by accepting not guilty pleas from uncounseled defendants
should not recur. Appellant here was arraigned before the effective date of the Criminal

Justice Act of 1964 ... " 352 F.2d at 947 n. 3.
37 Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MiNN. L. Rxv. 771, 779-81 (1961).

38 Judge Ainsworth's Address, 1965 Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, 38 F.R.D.
351, 356 (1966).
39 Ibid. Judge Ainsworth also notes that the defendant does not have the right to select

his own counsel from the panel.
40 Judge Thornberry's Address, 1965 Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, 38 F.R.D.
351, 361 (1966).

41 Id. at 360.
42 Ibid.
43

See § (c) of the Act in Appendix.
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United States"' has recommended that every district court's representation plan
include the provision that,
in the event a defendant is convicted following trial, counsel appointed
hereunder shall advise the defendant of his right of appeal and of his
right to counsel on appeal. If requested to do so by the defendant, counsel
shall file a timely notice of appeal, and he shall continue to represent the
defendant unless, or until, he is relieved by the court of appeals."
Such advice from assigned counsel will, most probably,
number of appeals which had been criticized as being
easily allowed under the previous system." However,
Report was of opinion that the right of appeal should
proved, and its viewpoint was adopted in the Act.

result in an increasing
too numerous and too
the Allen Committee
be expanded and im-

C. Compensation for Counsel and Other Services
Traditionally the common law has recognized a duty on the part of the
bar to render gratuitous legal services to the resourceless." However, since Johnson v. Zerbst" made such representation an obligation owed by society and not
by any particular class, it seems patently unjust to continue saddling the legal
profession with the sole financial burden." Moreover, besides placing an unjust
burden on the profession, the system of noncompensation often occasioned inequitable treatment of the indigent defendant. It practically guaranteed representation by young and inexperienced attorneys, 5 the result of which, in many
44 Section 3 of the Act, PuB. L. No. 455, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964) authorized
the Judicial Conference of the United States to issue rules and regulations for the formulation
of the representation plans by the district courts.

45 Judge Ainsworth's address, 1965 Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, 38 F.R.D.
351, 355 (1966).
46 See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, Are the Paupers Pampered? ITdigent Appellants in the Federal
Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 646 (1960).
47
The Committee is of the view that one basic objective of -a system of criminal appeals
is no different from that of other areas of criminal-law administration: namely, the
establishment of procedures adequate to protect the legitimate interests of the
accused irrespective of his financial status. We believe that this objective has not
yet been achieved in the federal appellate process and that the present system is
deficient both with reference to the proper assertion of defendant's rights and to
the efficient administration of justice. Allen Commitee Report at 90.
48 One recent federal case, which had attracted a great deal of attention for breaking
with the traditional view, is Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964), noted
in 78 HARv. L. Rv. 1654 (1965). There Judge East awarded an indigent's counsel the
reasonable value of his services, under an eminent domain theory, in an action under the
Tucker Act. This decision, however, was reversed in United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633
(9th Cir. 1965). The Ninth Circuit took the traditional view that an attorney has a duty
to render free services when requested to do so.
49 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
50 This was explicitly recognized by the Allen Committee Report, at 42:
Mhe proper functioning of the adversary system of justice, in which the nation
as a whole has an important stake, demands that the defense of accused persons
proceed at a level of zeal and effectiveness equivalent to that manifested in their
prosecution. The notion that the defense of accused persons can fairly or safely be
left to uncompensated attorneys reveals the fundamental misconception that the
representation of financially deprived defendants is essentially a charitable concern.

On the contrary, it is a public concern of high importance. A system of adequate

representation, therefore, should be structured and financed in a manner reflecting

its public importance.
51 Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District
Courts, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 579, 596 (1963).
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cases, Was a second-rate defense. 2 In addition, the probability of a less than
adequate defense was compounded many times over by a refusal to reimburse for
out-of-pocket expenses" and investigative services."
Sections (d) and (e) of the Criminal Justice Act, undoubtedly the most
controversial 5 provisions, attempt to alleviate these serious defects by allowing
compensation and reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses to assigned counsel
and to those who furnish investigative, expert or "other" necessary services.
Section (d), which deals specifically with counsel, allows remuneration at $15.00
per hour for court services and $10.00 per hour for out-of-court services, in
addition to reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred, up to a maximum of
$500.00 for a felony and $300.00 for a misdemeanor." It also provides the
same schedule and limits for appellate work. Section (e) allows, in addition
to expenses reasonably incurred, compensation to those who render investigative,
expert or other services, with a limit of $300.00 for each person or organization
rendering them. This section also provides that the defendant requesting such
services make an ex parte application to the court, and that the court make an
appropriate inquiry, also ex parte, as to the necessity of such services.5 ' Section
(e) does provide that in situations where the services cannot wait prior authorization they may be later ratified by the court, but it is evident that these applications will not be looked upon with favor by the courts."
52 Congressman Emanuel Celler (D. N.Y.), Chairman of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, made the following remarks during the House debate on the Criminal Justice

Act:

There is no compensation provided for counsel. Young attorneys seeking experience
covet these assignments in the Federal court. They are not skilled in matters of
this kind enough to pit themselves against the expertise of the U.S. attorney with the
result that the defendant does not, in common parlance, get a fair shake ...
These lawyers have not yet cut their eye teeth, so to speak, when they try these
cases, to the woeful disadvantage of the defendant. 110 CONG. REo. 421 (daily
ed. Jan. 15, 1964).
53 Note, The Representation of Indigent Ctiminal Defendants in the Federal District
Courts, 76 HIAv. L. R.v. 579, 598 (1963): "L]ack of reimbursement [of out-of-pocket
expenses] clearly burdens assigned counsel and inhibits preparation of a satisfactory defense
by all but the wealthiest or most dedicated lawyers."
54 Id. at 589. District court judges and U.S. attorneys were asked whether preparation
of defenses suffered from lack of funds for investigation. Nearly forty per cent felt that
such preparation was "seriously hampered." Less than ten per cent thought that preparation
was not hampered.
55 To illustrate the strong feelings stirred by this provision, Congresswoman Griffiths stated
during the House debate that, "as a lawyer, I have defended people in Federal court without
charge, and I considered it an honor and a privilege. . . . mhis is likely to become a
racket." 110 CONG. Rmc. 420 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1964).
56 That section states, however, that payments in excess of these limits, for work on
the trial level, will be allowed in extraordinary circumstances if the district court certifies
that such payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation.
The excess payment, however, ,must be approved by the chief judge of the circuit in which
the case arose. The payment itself is made to the assigned attorney, or to the bar association
or legal aid agency which makes the attorney available for assignment.
57 It would seem that the United States attorney should be excluded from these ex parte
proceedings, although the question has not been settled. See Judge Ainsworth's Address, 1965
judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, 38 F.R.D. 351, 357 (1966):
Whether the Act would preclude the presence of the United States Attorney to
oppose contradictorily when defense counsel requests authorization is not clear.
Certainly there can be situations where the United States Attorney would not be
entitled to know what steps are being taken by the defense in the investigative and
expert field in preparation for trial.
58
Judge Thomberry's Address, 1965 Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, 38 F.R.D.
351, 363 (1966):
The Judicial Conference has recommended that each of the Plans adopted by
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The limitations of $500.00 and $300.00, in felony and misdemeanor cases
respectively, have been criticized as being unrealistic and unfair, especially for
the more difficult cases. 9 This type of situation can be avoided, however, if the
courts and the chief judge of each circuit take a flexible and realistic approach
to the Act's provision for payment in excess of the limits for protracted and difficult cases. It is certainly true, however, that the hourly rates set by the Act
are much lower than prevailing legal fees.6" However, in the light of the congressional criticism of the Act they seem to be as high as could be expected.
Moreover, it could be argued that the hourly rate strikes a fair balance between
th profession's duty to serve and society's duty to compensate. As to the actual
making of payments, the Director of the Administrative Office of United States
Courts has been charged by the Judicial Conference with this responsibility.
The central disbursement office instituted by the Director must be notified of
every appointment of counsel and authorization of other services, vouchers for
payment must be sent there, and payments are to be made from that office
directly to the persons concerned.6
IV. Implementation of the Act
The comparatively small number of criminal cases in the federal courts,62
approximately a third of which will probably come under the provisions of the
Criminal Justice Act,"s make the program both manageable and relatively inexpensive." The first reports, in fact, indicate that the average payment to assigned counsel is approximately one-fifth the maximum permitted by the Act. 5
the District Court include the provision that applications for the ratification of
expenses incurred without court approval are not looked upon with favor except
in most unusual situations.
59 Judge Anderson's remarks, 1964 Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 36 F.R.D.
129, 139 (1965):
[Tbis is quite unrealistic and would operate very unfairly because an attorney might
have a long and very difficult felony case and wind up getting less than the minimum wage for labor whereas someone who had a rather easy misdemeanor case
could get the maximum fifteen dollars an hour.
60 E.g., the hourly rate under Michigan's suggested minimum state-wide fee schedule was
$25.00. 43 MICH. S.B.J. 9, 28 (Aug. 1964).
61 See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 36 F.R.D. 277,

284 (1965).
62

Some 30,000 criminal cases were filed in the district courts during fiscal year 1964.

ANNUAL

REPORT

COURTS

147 (1964).

OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

63 During the ten-month period from July, 1963 to April, 1964, counsel were assigned to
approximately thirty per cent of the criminal defendants acquitted or sentenced. REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Report of the Ad Hoe Committee to
Develop Rules, Procedures and Guidelines for an Assigned Counsel System, 36 F.R.D. 277,
381 (1965). One caveat is, however, that during that period the resourceless defendants
were told only that they had the right to counsel. Now that they are to be informed that
they have the right to have counsel appointed and paid for if they are financially unable to
do so, it is probable that the number of waivers will diminish considerably, with a corresponding increase in the percentage of cases where counsel are assigned.
64 The first full year of the Criminal justice Act's operation is expected to cost $7,500,000.
Judge Ainsworth's Address, 1965 judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, 38 F.R.D. 351,

354 (1966).

65 As of February 1, 1966, $123,108 had been paid to assigned counsel in 1,471 cases,
with the average payment being $82.08. Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 28, 1966, p. 22, col. 3.
However, with the average payment so low, one is led to wonder whether the Criminal
Justice Act is having the desired effect of encouraging more time and effort in such cases.
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Undoubtedly the most serious problem confronting the Criminal Justice Act's
implementation is the disinterest of most attorneys in criminal law," and the
attitude on the part of many that their professional obligation in that field may
be lightly put aside.6 ' This apparent cavalier attitude on the part of the bar is
the most serious problem because the Act itself leaves nearly all the administrative duties to the already overburdened district courts,' which in turn shift the
real burden to the organized bar.
Although the Act has been in operation too short a time for any definitive
statements, there are several examples of an excellent response from the bar.
The Fort Worth-Tarrant County Junior Bar Association has instituted "refresher
courses" in criminal law and procedure in that district so that attorneys there
who have dealt only with "civil law" might be able to better discharge their
responsibilities.6 9 In Dallas, an elaborate system was set up by the local bar
association. All 2,500 of the city's attorneys were exposed to an elaborate threelevel screening process before the final panel was selected. The Dallas plan then
provided for two panels, the regular panel consisting of all those who had practiced law three years and passed the screening, and the second consisting of
attorneys who had practiced less than three years. The members of the second
panel are to work as co-counsel, without compensation, with their counterparts
from the senior panel, and are to graduate to the senior panel after having practiced for three years. 0 One feature of the Chicago program is that students
from the city's six law schools work without compensation as aides to the assigned
counsel. Mr. Justice Clark has expressed the hope that such a program will
be extended to the entire federal system."
However, the response of the bar has not been altogether encouraging. For
example, one city limited its panels to younger attorneys and was criticized for
making the program a "'junior bar duty,' from which older and more affluent
lawyers should be exempt." ' Such a program is, of course, in direct violation
of the spirit of the Criminal Justice Act, since the idea behind compensation,
however small, was to induce the more experienced attorneys to take such cases.73
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See The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1964, p. 10, col. 3-4:
Not surprisingly, this new administrative chore isn't welcomed by the judges,
already overburdened by crowded trial dockets. The Judicial Conference privately
urged the Administration and Congress to find someone else to run the program.
But the Justice Department couldn't qualify because it is the prosecutor who will
do battle with the appointed lawyers. The Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare was eliminated for fear the program would pick up a "welfarism" label
and falter on Capitol Hill. So the judges got the job.
69 W. B. West's Address, 1965 Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, 38 F.R.D. 351,
371 (1966).
70 Id. at 369-71.
71 Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 28, 1966, p. 22, col. 1. The opinion was originally expressed
in an article appearing in the 1966 SAN DIEoo L. J. which has not been distributed as of
this writing.
72 W. B. West's Address, 1965 Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, 38 F.R.D. 351,
373 (1966).
73 See remarks of Congressman Celler, note 52 supra.
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A few cases of interest have thus far arisen under the Criminal Justice Act.
In United States v. Boyden,"4 Judge James M. Carter of the Southern District
of California held that the Act applied to a hearing to revoke probation, thus
allowing compensation for the assigned counsel's services. He reasoned, quite
correctly it seems, that such a hearing was a "criminal case" for the purposes of
the Act and that "since the Criminal Justice Act covers all procedures up through
appeal, a fortiori it covers all proceedings prior to appeal.""5 In Dirring v.
United States,"' Chief Judge Aldrich, speaking for the First Circuit, held that
the Act did not entitle a defendant to appointed counsel to prosecute a postappeal motion for new trial after he had had the assistance of counsel through
appeal, the rationale being that,
appellant had counsel "through appeal" as required by the Criminal Justice
Act.... We do not construe that phrase to include motion for a new trial.
Nor do we so interpret the Sixth Amendment. There must be an end....
After final conviction the appointment of counsel must rest in the discretion
of the court. We see no abuse of discretion in this case."7
The legislative history of the Criminal Justice Act seems to make it clear
that the Act does not apply to proceedings for writs of habeas corpus, to proceedings to vacate sentences under section 2255 of the Judicial Code or to any other
proceedings of a similar character which are collateral to the original case."'
However, in Application of Hagler,79 the District Court for Hawaii allowed
compensation to an attorney who filed a writ of habeas corpus, where application
for the writ was made before the defendant was required to plead and was
equivalent to, and cast in the form of, motions pursuant to Rules 12 and 48
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
V. Conclusion
The Criminal Justice Act recognizes that the requirement of equal justice
for all is not satisfied if a poor man is tried without the aid of a competent
attorney and whatever other services might be necessary for an adequate defense.
It also recognizes that the duty of providing counsel and other services is a
responsibility shared by society as a whole, and not merely the legal profession.
In this respect it is a milestone in the history of America's attitude toward both
the poor and the criminal law. It is also indicative of the fact that the legislative
branch of our government is now responding in an area the judicial branch
had been too long allowed to carry the burden alone.
The Act cannot, and will not, however, succeed in operation if the legal
profession in the United States does not render wholehearted support to its
administration. Extreme care must be taken to insure that each district court's
74
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panels are filled with the most competent and conscientious attorneys available.

If, despite the Criminal Justice Act, the burden of representing resourceless
criminal defendants continues to be borne only by the younger and more inexperienced members of the profession, the effort and sacrifice behind its passage
will, in large part, have been to no avail. The organized bar has thus far seemed
to have responded to the challenge. It is hoped that this initial reaction is a

fundamental and continuing one, and will not later be ascribed to a temporary
infatuation with a new program.
Only an infinitesimally small percentage of all American criminal cases are
filed in the federal courts. As other articles in this symposium issue indicate,
greater strides have been taken on the state and local levels to insure more equal
treatment of the poor criminal defendant, although there remains much to be
done. In this respect, no greater accolade could be given the Criminal Justice
Act than for all the states to enact similar programs. If this is to be the case,
then the Criminal Justice Act will have performed its greatest service by catalyz-

ing state reform, as have so many previous federal programs. This tendency
for reform in one level of our government to initiate repercussions in the others
is, in truth, the real strength of our unique system.
John J. Haugh
APPENDIX
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964
18 U.S.C.A. 3006A (Supp. 1965)
3006A. Adequate representation of defendants. - (a) Choice of Plan. - Each United
States district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in
operation throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for defendants charged
with felonies or misdemeanors, other than petty offenses as defined in section 1 of this title,
who are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense. Representation under each plan
shall include counsel and investigative, expert, and other services necessary to an adequate
defense. The provision for counsel under each plan shall conform to one of the following:
(1) Representation by private attorneys;
(2) Representation by attorneys furnished by a bar association or a legal aid agency; or
3) Representation according to a plan containing a combination of the foregoing.
Prior to approving the plan for a district, the judicial council of the circuit shall supplement
the plan with provisions for the representation on appeal of defendants financially unable to
obtain representation. Consistent with the provisions of this section, the district court may
modify a plan at any time with the approval of the judicial council of the circuit; it shall
modify the plan when directed by the judicial council of the circuit. The district court
shall notify the Administrative Office of the United States Courts of modifications in its plan.
(b) Appointment of Counsel.-In every criminal case in which the defendant is charged
with a felony or a misdemeanor, other than a petty offense, and appears without counsel,
the United States commissioner or the court shall advise the defendant that he has the right
to be represented by counsel and that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is
financially unable to obtain counsel. Unless the defendant waives the appointment of counsel,
the United States commissioner or the court, if satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the
defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent him.
The United States commissioner or the court shall appoint separate counsel for defendants
who have such conflicting interests that they cannot properly be represented by the same
counsel, or when other good cause is shown. Counsel appointed by the United States commissioner or a judge of the district court shall be selected from a panel of attorneys designated
or approved by the district court.
(c) Duration and Substitution of Appointments.-A defendant for whom counsel is
appointed shall be represented at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance
before the United States commissioner or court through appeal. If at any time after the
appointment of counsel the court having jurisdiction of the case finds that the defendant
is financially able to obtain counsel or to make partial payment for the representation, he may
terminate the appointment of counsel or authorize payment as provided in subsection (f),
as the interests of justice may dictate. If at any stage of the proceedings, including an
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appeal, the court having jurisdiction of the case finds that the defendant is financially unable
to pay counsel whom he had retained, the court may appoint counsel as provided in subsection
(b) and authorize payment as provided in subsection (d), as the interests of justice may
dictate. The United States commissioner or the court may, in the interests of justice, substitute one appointed counsel for another at any stage of the proceedings.
(d) Payment for Representation.-An attorney appointed pursuant to this section, or a
bar association or legal aid agency which made an attorney available for appointment, shall,
at the conclusion of the representation or any segment thereof, be compensated at a rate not
exceeding $15 per hour for time expended in court or before a United States commissioner,
and $10 per hour for time reasonably expended out of court, and shall be reimbursed for
expenses reasonably incurred. A separate claim for compensation and reimbursement shall
be made to the district court for representation before the United States commissioner or
that court, and to each appellate court before which the attorney represented the defendant.
Each claim shall be supported by a written statement specifying the time expended, services
rendered, and expenses incurred while the case was pending before the United States commissioner or court, and the compensation and reimbursement applied for or received in the
same case from any other source. The court shall, in each instance, fix the compensation
and reimbursement to be paid to the attorney, bar association or legal aid agency. For
representation of a defendant before the United States commissioner and the district court,
the compensation to be paid to an attorney, or to a bar association or legal aid agency for
the services of an attorney, shall not exceed $500 in a case in which one or more felonies
are charged, and $300 in a case in which only misdemeanors are charged. In extraordinary
circumstances, payment in excess of the limits stated herein may be made if the district court
certifies that such payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation, and the amount of the excess payment is approved by the chief judge of the
circuit. For representation of a defendant in an appellate court, the compensation to be
paid to an attorney, or to a bar association or legal aid agency for the services of an attorney,
shall in no event exceed $500 in a felony case and $300 in a case involving only misdemeanors.
(e) Services Other Than Counsel.-Counsel for a defendant who is financially unable
to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary to an adequate defense in his case
may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in
an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the defendant is financially
unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to obtain the services on behalf of
the defendant. The court may, in the interests of justice, and upon a finding that timely
procurement of necessary services could not await prior authorization, ratify such services
after they have been obtained. The court shall determine reasonable compensation for the
services and direct payment to the organization or person who rendered them upon the filing of
a claim for compensation supported by an affidavit specifying the time expended, services rendered, and expenses incurred on behalf of the defendant, and the compensation received in the
same case or for the same services from any other source. The compensation to be paid to a
person for such service rendered by him to a defendant under this subsection, or to be paid
to an organization for such services rendered by an employee thereof, shall not exceed $300,
exclusive of reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred.
(f) Receipt of Other Payments.-Whenever the court finds that funds are available for
payment from or on behalf of a defendant, the court may authorize or direct that such funds
be paid to the appointed attorney, to the bar association or legal aid agency which made
the attorney available for appointment, to any person or organization authorized pursuant
to subsection (e) to render investigative, expert, or other services, or to the court for deposit
in the Treasury as a reimbursement to the appropriation, current at the time of payment, to
carry out the provisions of this section. Except as so authorized or directed, no such person
or organization may request or accept any payment or promise of payment for assisting in
representation of a defendant.
(g) Rules and Reports.-Each district court and judicial council of a circuit shall submit
a report on the appointment of counsel within its jurisdiction to the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts in such form and at such times as the Judicial Conference of
the United States may specify. The Judicial Conference of the United States may, from
time to time, issue rules and regulations governing the operation of plans formulated under
this section.
(h) Appropriations.-There are authorized to be appropriated to the United States
courts, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, sums necessary to
carry out the provisions of this section. When so specified in appropriation acts, such appropriations shall remain available until expended. Payments from such appropriations shall
be made under the supervision of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts.
(i) Districts Included.-The term "district court' as used in this section includes the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, the District Court of Guam, and the district courts of
the United States created by chapter 5 of title 28, United States Code [28 §§ 81-144].
(Aug. 20, 1964, P. L. 88-455, § 2, 78 Stat. 552.)

